This article discusses whether pseudoscience can be classified as science, focusing on the philosophical perspectives of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn on the philosophy of science. This article explains why pseudoscience is not recognized as science and clarifies the difference between its nature and scientific theories.
Walking down the street, most of us have encountered people proselytizing about their religion at some point. Even if you haven’t, you probably know someone who does, and with Christmas and Buddha’s Birthday being recognized as national holidays in South Korea, we’re closer to the concept of religion than you might think.
Whatever the religion, its teachings (such as creationism) are often referred to as pseudoscience (or pseudo-science). Of course, these are not the only pseudoscience, but everything from religious concepts like creationism to eugenics are categorized as pseudoscience. Pseudoscience is often controversial because it is characterized by misleading the public, promoting prejudice and discrimination, and imposing narrow-minded values.
In the case of pseudoscience, which we often encounter, we can ask the question: Is pseudoscience science? The dictionary definition of science is “the activity of interpreting natural phenomena and creating a body of knowledge based on curiosity about them”. If we consider pseudoscience based on this dictionary definition, it seems that many concepts, such as creationism, can be included in the category of science.
This essay aims to present my thoughts on the question “Is pseudoscience science?”. In particular, I will discuss this question from a philosophical perspective, particularly that of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, and will conclude with some typical examples of pseudoscience.
Before answering the original question, let’s take a look at how Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper view science. In his book, Karl Popper argued that the rationalist tradition of the ancient Greek schools of thought was the only way to expand our knowledge. He derived critical rationalism from Fallibilism, the belief that human reason is imperfect and fallible. Critical rationalism is best summarized in Popper’s words
“The conscious desire to learn from mistakes and by the continuous correction of mistakes is the principle of the attitude I call critical rationalism.” – Karl Popper, Das Elend des Historizismus (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1974), p.ⅸ.
Popper believed that scientific theories are only those that follow the process of . He argued that observation is unreliable and cannot be used as an argument for establishing a theory because the results can vary depending on the observer or the circumstances of the observation. Therefore, observation and experimentation are used to prove or disprove a theory, not to prove it. In his view, new theories consist of speculations, which are then refuted through experimentation and observation. Furthermore, currently accepted theories may be close to the truth, but they cannot be said to be the truth.
Popper argued that in order to be categorized as a scientific theory, a theory must be arguable. The term indefeasibility is used in two senses: in a purely logical sense and in the sense that it cannot be empirically refuted. This is equivalent to saying that a scientific theory is compatible with any possible empirical statement.
Thomas Kuhn, on the other hand, had a different view of science. For Kuhn, the most important keyword in science is “paradigm”. This can be interpreted as a universally recognized scientific achievement that provides an exemplary problem and solution for a group of experts at a certain time. The elements of a paradigm are symbolic generalizations (including formulations such as F=ma), models (such as the model of gas motion in gas kinematics), and legends. Kuhn believed that the process of scientific activity occurs through the shifting of paradigms. He used the concept of normal science to describe this. However, Kuhn did not think that normal science was perfect; he believed that normal science became mainstream because it encompassed or had advantages over other theories of the time, and that not all phenomena could be explained within its framework. When a problem arises that cannot be solved within the framework of normal science (the occurrence of anomalies), it causes a crisis in normal science. This leads to the rejection of the existing paradigm, and to overcome this crisis, scientists go through a process of scientific revolution and adopt a new paradigm.
In response to the question, “Is the newly accepted paradigm superior to the existing paradigm?”, Kuhn argued that the competition between paradigms is not straightforward, and proposed the concept of incommensurability. This means that there is no common yardstick against which to compare different theories or paradigms.
So that’s Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn’s view of scientific theory. Now let’s get back to the original question: is pseudoscience science? There were indeed philosophers who defended pseudoscience (although they didn’t use the term). FireAvent argued that ‘there is nothing special about science, and astrology can be a science’ (astrology is now classified as a pseudoscience). He believed that the best way to make science science was to allow as many different and novel hypotheses as possible to multiply without any restrictions.
However, the arguments in favor of pseudoscience are thoroughly criticized by Popper and Kuhn. Take, for example, creationism, the most easily recognized pseudoscience. In Popper’s view, for creationism to be categorized as a scientific theory, the most important concept is that of demonstrability. What empirical evidence is there to disprove creationism’s hypothesis that “the natural world is too complex to be explained by evolutionary processes”? Since creationism claims that God designed everything, how do we choose examples to disprove it? The fundamental problem with creationism is that we cannot find examples to disprove it. This means that creationism is not disprovable, and in Popper’s view, creationism cannot be a scientific theory.
In Kuhn’s view, creationism cannot be a scientific theory either. The most important keyword in Kuhn’s view of science is paradigm. Paradigms are derived from normal science. Normal science means research activities based on past scientific achievements. Is there any scientific achievement by creationism? We can answer this question in the negative. Evolutionary theory, the currently accepted paradigm, has clarified the question of biological change and diversity, spawned scientific societies, and generated new discoveries. However, compared to the many great achievements of evolutionary theory, there are no scientific achievements or accomplishments attributed to creationism, nor is there a sense of crisis with the existing paradigm of evolutionary theory that would be necessary for creationism to become a new paradigm for explaining the natural world, and there are many natural phenomena to be explored by evolutionary theory. This means that creationism cannot be accepted as a new paradigm, and therefore, in Kuhn’s view, creationism cannot be a scientific theory.
Another example of a pseudoscience is eugenics. Eugenics, founded in 1883 by Golton in England, aims to increase the number of people with superior traits and prevent the increase of people with inferior traits. All conditions and factors that contribute to the development of people with physical and mental defects are central to the study. From Popper and Kuhn’s point of view, can eugenics be classified as a scientific theory?
Let’s think about the empirical aspect of eugenics: can we find empirical examples to disprove the claims of eugenics? The object of study in eugenics is people with physical and mental defects. So, within the framework of eugenics, this question means the same thing: can we find empirical examples that show that people with defects in certain areas are actually less defective than people without them? This is empirically impossible because we have already established the premise that they have a defect, and we cannot compare all the genes of a person and conclude that they are inferior. The same is true from Kuhn’s perspective. For eugenics to be accepted as a paradigm, it needs to be universally accepted, providing examples and solutions for experts. Of course, eugenics is accepted in some parts of the world. However, it is practiced in a small number of piecemeal countries, and its operation is debated. This suggests that eugenics is not universally accepted, and therefore lacks the ability to function as a paradigm. From Kuhn’s point of view, eugenics cannot be accepted as a scientific theory.
For this reason, pseudoscience cannot be categorized as science. Of course, this essay has criticized two representative examples of pseudoscience, but most pseudoscience can be criticized from the perspective of both philosophers of science. Pseudoscience is not developed through a deductive process; rather, pseudoscience has its own theories and uses observed facts or experimental results not to criticize existing theories, but to interpret them in a way that somehow fits within its theoretical framework. Therefore, since all observed cases operate within the framework of pseudoscience, the claims of pseudoscience are not inherently disproven by these observations. Furthermore, pseudoscience is generally not accepted by most scientists in the scientific community, and the various pseudoscientific claims are not used to disprove mainstream, normal science, but rather normal science is used to refute pseudoscience. In other words, pseudoscience does not serve as a paradigm.
Of course, this is not the same as saying that pseudoscience is completely meaningless. It can actually influence currently accepted scientific theories. Just as alchemy had a profound impact on chemistry in the past because of its desire to make gold, it would be absurd to assume that pseudoscience is meaningless. However, it is my opinion that it cannot be categorized as science because its nature does not fit the characteristics of a scientific theory.
