This article recognizes that animal cloning research can benefit humans, but emphasizes that moral consideration of animal rights and welfare is essential. It argues that when animal and human interests conflict, a balanced approach is required, and that animals should be recognized as objects of moral consideration.
Ian Wilmert’s creation of Dolly, a cloned sheep, sparked interest in cloning, but since then, bioethics has been on the rise. However, the moral considerations for the animals that have been subjected to so much experimentation and the possibility of cloning have not been as loudly voiced. Ian Coleman said in his lecture.
“Finally, we can ask whether nuclear replacement research in animals should have been done, and whether it should continue. The answer should be an unquestioning yes. As Wilmert makes clear, there is vast potential for cloning work on non-human animals to provide beneficial solutions to many of the problems that cause human suffering.”
However, in recent years, there has been a growing social awareness of animal rights, and as a proponent of animal rights, I believe that animal cloning is ethically problematic, so I’m going to argue against it.
What are animal rights? To answer this question, let’s first look at Peter Singer’s theory of animal liberation. Animal liberation doesn’t literally mean freeing animals from zoos or farms. Instead, it’s about shifting our everyday thinking to make it clear that animals are objects of moral consideration, and treating them accordingly. To examine whether animals should be subject to moral consideration, we can start with the question of why humans have rights. We hear the phrase “all human beings have rights” so often that we take it for granted. But why don’t animals enjoy the same rights as humans? Is it because they are not human? Is it because humans are superior to animals? If humans have more capabilities than animals, what capabilities, specifically, justify their superior rights?
There are several arguments for this.
The first is language, but language cannot be the basis for rights either. The Linguistic Institute at Georgia State University in the United States, which has been studying bonobo language since the 1970s, reports that bonobos have acquired rudimentary language, and whales and dolphins also have the ability to communicate with each other. Furthermore, if language were a criterion for rights, then disabled people who cannot speak would be excluded from moral consideration.
The second argument is that only humans are considered moral agents. However, this is not entirely correct. Animals are also capable of empathy, which plays an important role in moral judgment. In this regard, James Rachels cites an experiment conducted at Northwestern University. Given the choice of starving or giving a coworker a strong electric shock, many rhesus monkeys chose to starve for a few days. These monkeys’ choices can be considered emotional behavior, which is a key element of morality. In addition, babies, the mentally ill, and the mentally retarded, for example, cannot be considered moral agents, and if the first assumption is true, they do not have moral rights.
The third is that human intelligence is higher than animal intelligence. But if intelligence is the criterion for rights, this would justify differential rights even within human groups, and some unfortunate humans with lower intelligence than animals would be unable to exercise their rights as human beings.
The fourth is the human capacity for reason, in which case the collective capacity of an entity to solve problems and have cognitive responses is questioned. According to Fox, only beings with critical self-consciousness, the ability to manipulate complex concepts and use sophisticated language, and the capacity to reflect, plan, deliberate, choose, and accept responsibility for their actions are worthy of moral consideration. But can we say that animals are not rational? Is it okay to treat all non-rational beings the same, e.g., is there no difference between hitting a pig and hitting a tree? Should non-rational humans be deprived of rights? These are just a few of the many issues that make rationality a poor criterion.
Finally, there is the argument that just being human is a reason to have rights. However, simply belonging to a group does not guarantee a person’s rights or status. It is wrong to favor one’s own group for no other reason than to treat members of another group unfairly. Sexism is when we use our gender to discriminate against other genders, racism is when we use our race to discriminate against other races, and finally, speciesism is when we use our humanity to prioritize human beings because they are human beings.
Now we’ve seen that the line between humans and animals can be somewhat blurred, no matter what differences we’re talking about. The differences between animals and humans are more average than qualitative, although they are certainly more pronounced than the differences between men and women or between races. Furthermore, the criteria listed above for justifying discrimination are quite arbitrary. Furthermore, while “difference” is a matter of fact, “discrimination” is a matter of value. When we try to derive values from facts, we commit the so-called naturalistic fallacy. When we try to justify discrimination by referring to the differences between humans and non-human animals, we commit the naturalistic fallacy.
Peter Singer, a leading animal liberationist, has argued that from an animal bioethics perspective, if all beings feel pleasure and pain, they deserve equal moral consideration, and that speciesism, which discriminates between humans and animals, is wrong. It is clear that animals are capable of feeling pleasure and pain, as evidenced by their behavior in the presence of pain, their similarity to humans, their similar nervous systems, and the fact that pain is evolutionarily useful, so the animals that have survived so far must be capable of feeling pain. Now that we assume that animals and humans are equalized, consider the case where the interests of animals and humans are at odds. For example, if cats are roaming the streets and picking up food waste, causing epidemics and dirtying the streets, should they be kept alive as a matter of moral consideration? It seems counterintuitive to keep cats alive in this situation. On the contrary, people may feel it is their duty to catch and destroy the cat. The cats are not roaming the streets with the intention of spreading the disease; they are simply trying to survive in filthy conditions and are unintentionally spreading the disease. If you’re trying to be objective, it’s anthropocentric to have feelings of anger towards these animals. But we can’t just blame people for being anthropocentric. In cases like this, humans can suffer in ways that may outweigh the benefits of the animals. However, killing them because they are harming humans is not the right way to go. We need to be more cautious, and we need to discuss the conflicting interests of humans and animals in more depth and find solutions.
What about Dolly the cloned sheep and the subsequent expansion of nuclear-substitution cloning research? Animal cloning is concerning because it makes human cloning possible. However, this fear is only based on the blurring of the boundaries between humans and animals. In fact, animal cloning could ultimately help improve human health by allowing for research into human genetic diseases, organ transplants, and more. There are also positive aspects to consider, such as the protection of endangered species. However, ethical issues are unavoidable given that such research involves animal suffering. We need a balanced approach that recognizes the positive aspects of animal cloning, but also takes into account the welfare and rights of animals.
In conclusion, the debate on animal cloning should be a process of finding a balance between animal rights and human interests. We need to move away from anthropocentric thinking and recognize that animals are also subject to moral considerations, and cloning research should be conducted in a way that respects their interests and rights.
