Ha-Seok Jang’s Science Meets Philosophy covers the concept and historical development of the philosophy of science, criticizing Kuhn’s monism and suggesting the need for pluralism. However, he criticizes the vagueness of the concept of a system of practice and the practical problems of pluralism that make the argument unconvincing.
In Jang Ha-Seok’s Science Meets Philosophy, a Korean introduction to the philosophy of science, Jang briefly explains Popper’s “disproversialism,” Kuhn’s “paradigm,” and “normal science,” the most famous concepts in the philosophy of science. “Disprovabilism” is a view of science in which hypotheses or theories are continually confirmed by observation or experiment, and disproved hypotheses or theories are replaced by better ones, thus advancing science. A “normal science” is a research endeavor that is firmly grounded in one or more past scientific achievements, and a “paradigm” is a specific puzzle that can be substituted for an explicit set of rules and a collective set of beliefs, values, skills, etc. shared by members of a given community of scientists as the sustaining principle of normal science. This paradigm is a scientific achievement, which follows from the definition of normal science mentioned above, and can be viewed as a system of theories recognized by scientists of a particular era. He shows how the philosophy of science has developed around these concepts, and he also shows how scientific inquiry has been carried out, drawing on important anecdotes from the history of science. Kuhn argues that in the steady state of science, there is only one paradigm for each scientific discipline. Once a paradigm is established and everyone agrees with it, there is no need to waste energy on useless philosophical debates, and researchers can focus deeply on the problems defined by the paradigm and solve them effectively. However, Jang questions this monistic view, and in the final section, he proposes a new direction for science: pluralism. He argues that it is good to develop and maintain as many different systems of practice as possible, even within a single field of science.
As he points out in the book, it is not so simple to find a single correct answer in science. While Kuhn is right that if there is only one paradigm, research can be done effectively by focusing on that paradigm, there is also something to be gained from debate among scientists working on different systems of practice. I think views on pluralism are a bit like languages. There are many languages on the planet due to cultural differences, and there are individuals who can speak multiple languages. However, the convenience of a unified language would be immeasurable. However, just as there are beautiful expressions in certain languages that cannot be expressed in other languages, it is questionable whether it is possible to unify into one perfect language. Unification of languages would mean that speakers of other languages would have to give up their culture, which is not feasible in reality. Therefore, like language, I think science should aim for a pluralistic paradigm that does not coexist with multiple paradigms as in Kuhn’s normal science, but whether this is actually possible is a separate issue, and in that sense, I think pluralism in science is a realistic compromise that is worth discussing. However, there are some criticisms of his rationale for pluralism that I would like to address.
Before explaining pluralism, Jang introduces the term “system of practice,” which, according to him, refers to a particular form of practicing science. However, once he gives this brief definition, he uses the term without further explanation. This is in contrast to Kuhn’s efforts in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, where he goes to great lengths to define paradigm and normal science. Furthermore, in his paper “Pluralism: A New Framework for a Convergence of History and Philosophy of Science’, there are only four mentions of the term in the same sentence. In one of those references, Jang states that Kuhn’s paradigm is also a kind of practice system. This extremely vague definition makes the concept of ‘practice system’ virtually synonymous with ‘theory’.
Jang cites two main benefits of pluralism. The first is the benefit of tolerance. He refers to tolerance as seeking the coexistence of multiple systems of practice. Since there is always the possibility that the current paradigm will one day be discarded, it can act as an insurance policy against such unpredictability. It also allows for an intellectual division of labor and allows us to achieve our goals in multiple ways. Finally, doing science in an idiomatic way allows us to achieve multiple goals, not just one. The second is the ‘benefit of interaction’. This is the idea that different systems of practice can benefit from each other through exchange. He characterizes these interactions as convergence, adoption, and competition. These ways of interacting include convergence, adoption, and competition: fusing practices as needed, reinterpreting and adopting parts of other practices, or working harder to prepare for each other’s criticisms.
He recognizes the benefits of pluralism, as well as its concerns, and advocates for it. First, there is the concern that too much autonomy can lead to relativism, where this is good and that is bad. In response, Jang argues that even the most pluralistic systems can only be realistically sustainable. Pluralism does not mean that we should accept all opinions, but that we should judge and select the best and most promising systems. The second is a concern about limited resources. Is it possible to allocate research funds, human resources, etc. to maintain multiple systems of practice? It is argued that our society is not so poor that it can only afford one system of practice. Finally, he mentions the concern that it is mentally impossible to do science pluralistically. However, Jang argues that individuals do not need to use multiple systems of practice simultaneously, and that individuals can acquire multiple systems of practice, just as they can learn multiple languages.
However, I find these arguments to be overly optimistic and unsupported. I disagree with some of the benefits he cites, and I find the defense of the concerns to be unconvincing. First, in the benefit of tolerance, Jang mentions the intellectual division of labor, noting that GPS is an excellent system of practice that fuses Newtonian mechanics, general relativity, and special relativity. However, it is not technically a science, but rather engineering. Science is a system of knowledge that aims to describe and understand nature, whereas engineering is an applied system of knowledge that aims to design, invent, improve, and produce man-made objects. So in engineering, you try different methods, different theories, and if something works, you adopt it, even if you don’t understand exactly why it works. For example, ships are very large, so rigorous experiments to find the optimal thickness of a ship are not cost-effective, and the thickness of ships currently being built is used because it does not cause stability problems. In the case of machine learning, machine learning models are applied differently, and algorithms are tuned based on trial and error and data. Therefore, GPS is a product of engineering and is not an appropriate example to use in philosophy of science.
Jang also explains that the benefits of tolerance can serve a purpose in many ways, citing the phlogiston theory as enriching our eyes to observe and understand chemical phenomena. However, he does not believe that the phlogiston theory will ever be part of a viable system of practice that he argues for in his first defense. He argues that there are some phenomena that the phlogiston theory explains better than the oxygen theory, and that if the phlogiston theory had been retained, it could have evolved into an electron theory or an activation energy theory. However, I think this is an inappropriate analogy, as if the theory of relativity says that there is no absolute observer and coordinate system, so if the phlogiston theory had not been discarded but coexisted with the geodynamic theory, it could have led to relativity through the approach that there is no absolute observer. Also, even if phlogiston theory was developed into electron or activation energy theory, it is not a ‘phlogiston practice’ but rather a broader conceptual practice that can explain phlogiston theory, just as quantum mechanics can explain the phenomena of Newtonian mechanics.
Second, as for the argument about the distribution of scarce resources, it is too vague to assume that this is simply possible. I think it is quite an optimistic claim, considering that there are still research fields that complain of a lack of resources, that the distribution of talent is divided by their preferred research fields, and that in the current capitalist system, the distribution of research funding is also dictated by public interest and political interests. On the other hand, we also have to think about whether research is already being conducted in a pluralistic way in the era we are living in.
Finally, regarding the idea that an individual can master multiple systems of practice, if we take “system of practice” to mean the same thing as “theory,” I think it’s a valid argument, as “system of practice” is a very broad term, and there are many people studying physics and chemistry. However, Jang uses Lagrangian and Hamiltonian dynamics in physics as an example of the coexistence of multiple systems of practice because, as mentioned earlier in the book, math is different from science, and there can be multiple solutions to a problem, so Lagrangian and Hamiltonian dynamics coexist because they use math as a tool. I think we need a clearer explanation of whether the tools for interpreting the practice system of mechanics are different, or whether these mathematical tools can also be seen as a practice system.
Taken together, Jang’s pluralism has many merits. However, there are many areas of disagreement with his arguments and examples that make them less convincing and require further explanation. In particular, the word “system of practice,” which is central to the pluralism he describes in this book, is used indiscriminately in the same way that “paradigm” was once used, and a clearer definition is needed. However, as mentioned earlier, monism seems to be an unattainable goal in the vast world of science, and with some refinement, his system of pluralism could be an alternative. In his paper ‘Pluralism: A New Framework for Integrated History and Philosophy of Science,” Jang argues that monism has poisoned the history and philosophy of science, and that pluralism can provide an antidote. To further support his argument, Kuhn illustrates his paradigm with examples from the history of science, such as the Scientific Revolution, but it would also make his pluralist framework more robust to illustrate pluralism with examples from the past and present in the history of science, especially the present, where he argues in his paper that pluralism is already present: recognize plurality where it is present.
