This article describes normative ethics and metaethics, which address the nature of moral judgment and truth. Moral realism views moral judgments as objective truths, while emotivism views them as expressions of subjective feelings. The two positions understand the validity of moral judgments differently, and provide explanations for the differences in motivations for ethical behavior and moral judgments.
We make moral judgments every day, such as “it is right to help the weak.” If normative ethics deals with the question of moral judgments about concrete actions like this, then metaethics deals with the concepts and principles used in normative ethics, such as the question of the meaning of right, the question of the existence of moral truth, and so on. In meta-ethics, moral realism and emotivism make opposing claims about how we understand the meaning of “right” and “wrong” and about the existence of moral truths.
Moral realism views moral judgments and moral truths as the same as scientific judgments and scientific truths: just as scientific judgments represent propositions that can be judged “true” or “false,” and those judged true are called scientific truths, so do moral judgments represent propositions that can be judged true or false, and those judged true are called moral truths. But if “it is wrong to steal” is a moral truth, as moral realism claims, then in order to determine that it is true, we must be able to find in stealing the objectively real property of being morally wrong.
On the other hand, on emotivism, there is no objectively existent property of being morally right or morally wrong about a moral act, and moral judgments do not represent propositions that are judged to be true or false. So, while emotivism makes moral judgments of rightness or wrongness, it holds that, unlike moral realism, there are no moral truths like scientific truths. So, what does emotivism mean by rightness or wrongness? According to emotivism, rightness and wrongness are emotions and attitudes toward specific behaviors, such as stealing: a judgment that “stealing is right” is an expression of approval of stealing, and a judgment that “stealing is wrong” is an expression of disapproval of stealing.
This emotivism provides a simpler explanation than moral realism for how moral judgments motivate us to engage in ethical behavior. This is because we don’t need anything other than the approval or disapproval emotions that moral judgments express to explain what motivates us to do ethical acts: approval emotions are the emotions of seeing an act as good and desiring it to happen, which leads directly to the motivation to do it. Disapproval emotions work the same way. In contrast, moral realism requires an understanding of human desires and emotions in addition to moral judgments. For example, in addition to “it is right to help the weak,” we need to add laws about human desires and emotions, such as “people want the weak to not get into difficult situations.” Only then can moral realism explain how we are motivated to do the ethical act of helping the weak. Since laws about human desires and emotions are not readily available, emotivism is appreciated over moral realism for being able to explain the motivation for ethical behavior without them.
Differences in moral judgments between people can also be explained simply according to emotivism, which understands the meanings of right and wrong as expressions of approval and disapproval emotions. When people disagree about an ethical issue, we don’t have to say that it’s because one side is wrong; we can explain that they just have different feelings and attitudes. This is important because it allows us to avoid extreme confrontation over differences in moral judgment.
However, emotivism, which equates rightness and wrongness with emotions, also raises several problems. First, it says that whenever emotions change, moral judgments change, but moral judgments do not change from time to time; second, emotions can change for no reason, but moral judgments cannot change for no apparent reason; third, it says that if there are no emotions, there is no “morally right” and “morally wrong,” but the idea that there is no “morally right” and “morally wrong” is contrary to universal recognition.
The debate between moral realism and emotivism occupies an important place in modern ethics, and it helps us understand the nature of moral truth and moral judgment. The moral realist view holds that moral truths exist objectively, and that moral judgments have objective criteria by which we can distinguish truth from falsehood. Emotivism, on the other hand, holds that moral judgments depend on individual feelings and attitudes, and are expressions of subjective emotions rather than objective truths. These two positions offer fundamentally different approaches to dealing with moral issues, and by understanding the strengths and weaknesses of each, we can better understand the complexity of moral judgment.
Therefore, it is important to consider both of these positions when discussing the validity of moral judgments. We need a balanced approach that recognizes the objectivity of moral realism while understanding the subjective elements of emotivism. This will allow us to have deeper and richer moral discussions.
