As biotechnology has advanced by leaps and bounds since the discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953, so has the possibility of human cloning. While cloning technology holds great promise for organ transplants and treating genetic diseases, there are also ethical concerns surrounding it. This article will examine Putnam and Coleman’s opposition to cloning technology and offer rebuttals and alternative solutions to their arguments, emphasizing the need for human cloning research.
Since Watson and Crick unraveled the structure of DNA in 1953, biotechnology and genetic engineering have been advancing rapidly. As a result, humans have benefited from the development of cures for many diseases, GMO foods, and more. While advances in the life sciences have brought great convenience to humans, the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep in 1997 raised concerns about human cloning technology. However, human cloning technology is essential to the advancement of the life sciences. The benefits to humans from its application are endless. For example, cloning human embryos could lead to rejection-free organ transplants, which could improve the quality of life for more patients. It could also play an important role in researching and treating the genetic causes of rare genetic diseases. Therefore, human cloning technology should go beyond mere experimentation and become a technology with real medical value.
In this article, we’ll examine the arguments of two opposing views on human cloning, Hilary Putnam and Allyn Coleman, and then refute them in order to reduce societal fears of human cloning.
First, let’s look at Putnam’s argument. Putnam posits a society in which human cloning technology becomes widespread and the majority of couples utilize it because they want to have a child that looks exactly like them. In his view, choosing the type of child the parents want reduces the child to an object for the parents’ desired lifestyle, which is inconsistent with Kant’s argument that people should not be treated as means to an end. He also argues that such a society would result in a monolithic family in which all family members are genetically similar, creating problems similar to the Nazis’ rejection of racial diversity and Scandinavia’s eugenics-based sterilization of the unfit. Putnam values the unpredictability and diversity of children, and argues that a family that includes these values is consistent with the morals of a democratic society.
Putnam’s argument is refuted: even if human cloning technology becomes available, the society Putnam posits will not come to pass. Putnam’s use of Nazi and Scandinavian examples suggests that his hypothetical society would be based on eugenic ideas. However, consider the case of cosmetic surgery: while cosmetic surgery can be considered eugenic, there are many more people who do not have cosmetic surgery. Similarly, the society Putnam postulates is unlikely to emerge even if human cloning technology becomes available. We’ve already been through history with Nazi and Scandinavian sterilization, and we don’t think it’s right, so it’s unlikely that we’ll see a return to the pursuit of a homogenized family.
Also, just because the technology exists doesn’t mean everyone will use it. Just as plastic surgery is popular but many people don’t choose to have it, there will still be many people who won’t choose to use human cloning technology even as it becomes more advanced. It’s unlikely that we’ll ever see a homogenization where everyone in society uses one type of technology, and individual choice and autonomy will remain.
Sure, there may be a small number of couples who have children who look exactly like them. But is it morally wrong to make children look exactly like their parents, as Putnam suggests? Kant argued that in an ideal family, the members do not see each other as objects of their parents’ ends, but as ends in their own right, and respect each other as human beings whose plans and happiness are important to them. Hegel also saw parents as the guarantors of their children’s autonomy. Putnam argues that if we take these values and apply them to the morality of the family, then morality must also include a willingness to accept diversity, and that human cloning is a violation of this. But this argument is not correct. It’s hard to argue that accepting uniformity in a situation where uniformity is acceptable is an act of unwillingness to accept diversity. Nor can it be said that having a child who looks exactly like you violates the child’s autonomy. This is because not all children have the autonomy to decide how they will be shaped.
Second, let’s look at Coleman’s argument. Coleman argues that cloning research on humans should not be attempted because it is unsafe and inefficient. It took hundreds of cell fusions to create Dolly the cloned sheep, and many embryos were discarded. Coleman argues that attempting to clone humans would result in many more embryos being discarded, and would cause both surrogates and biological parents physical and psychological pain. There’s also the possibility that a child born from the laborious process could be severely deformed. Even if the technology is perfected in other animals and then applied to humans to solve these problems, there is no guarantee of stability due to the large genetic differences between mammalian species. He also argues that even if human cloning technology is used to prevent women with defective mitochondria from passing them on to their children, it cannot be justified because the risks of the nuclear replacement process greatly outweigh the benefits. In other words, he concludes that human cloning, in whatever form it takes, is unethical.
Coleman’s argument is that the physical and psychological suffering of surrogacy can be solved by the development of in vitro culture technology. In vitro culture is the process of growing human embryos outside of the mother’s body, and Magdalena Jernika-Goetz and her team at the University of Cambridge’s Department of Physiology in the UK have successfully cultured human embryos for 13 days. Although the 13-day culture has not yet been successful, if the technology advances, it will be possible to clone human embryos for organ transplantation without the need for surrogate mothers. Chimpanzees, the species most closely related to humans evolutionarily, are also currently being cloned. As the technology continues to be perfected in more human-like animals, it is possible that human cloning will be stable enough that the risks will not outweigh the benefits.
Finally, the ethical concerns raised by advances in human cloning technology are already being addressed by similar issues in many other scientific fields. When stem cell research and gene editing first emerged, there were many objections and concerns, but researchers overcame them by strengthening ethical standards and increasing safety. If human cloning follows the same path, it could pave the way for human society to safely use cloning technology within a new ethical framework.
In this article, we have examined Putnam and Coleman’s arguments against human cloning and have refuted them or proposed solutions to their problems. We hope that this will help society to allay some of the fear and hostility toward human cloning. Human cloning technology has the potential to contribute significantly to the advancement of life sciences. Let’s not antagonize these technologies out of ethical and instinctive fears. Humanity has always been good at advancing science and technology and solving the problems that come with it. Now it’s our turn to advance human cloning technology.
