This article explains how Petrus Abaelardus and Thomas Aquinas defined the concept of moral good and evil and took different approaches to evaluating the goodness or badness of human behavior. It also discusses how Thomas’s theory compensated for the limitations of Petrus’s ethics.

Petrus Abaelardus’s concept of good and evil

Petrus Abaelardus recognizes that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. So how does he explain the “evil” we actually encounter? He first acknowledges the pervasive presence of evil in our society. Petrus explains the concept of good and evil in two ways: the first refers to “good or evil itself as a thing,” and the second refers to “the situation in which evil or good exists. He argues that ‘the existence of evil itself’ is not always ‘evil’. Take the example of the poor man. There was once a poor man who worked hard to escape his poverty, succeeded, and became rich. He then used his money to help the poor and started a charitable organization. In this example, “poverty” exists as an evil, but a “situation of good” occurred in the form of “starting a charity project.” In other words, we cannot value the “existence of evil” of “poverty” as “evil” in and of itself.
So, can evil be seen as a force that limits the divine front? Petrus says no. Evil in the world as we see it, he says, “converges to good” in the world as God sees it. An example of this is how the worldly evil of poverty is transformed into the good of charity. In other words, because humans are ignorant, what we see as evil at the moment converges into good in God’s dimension. However, because we are ignorant, we cannot know when or how what exists as evil will be realized as good, so we must simply trust that God will realize it as good. This raises a question: If we know that when we do something, it will always be realized as good in the divine dimension, doesn’t it become meaningless to think about whether it is moral or not? However, Petrus believes that human moral acts are still meaningful: we cannot know whether they are good or evil, but we can know whether we did them with good or evil intentions. Petrus believes that the goodness or badness of intentions can distinguish between moral and immoral actions.

Thomas Aquinas’s concept of moral good and evil

Thomas Aquinas argued that because God created perfect goodness, our wills always want what is good. For example, a person commits murder, but not because he wants evil, but because he wants the sensory pleasure that comes from the act of killing. He considers the sensory pleasure he desires to be good. But Thomas says that while God gave man free will, he did not intend for him to abuse it and commit sin. In other words, it is not a divinely given inclination for man to choose evil. But human free will and the inability to choose evil seem incompatible. So how does Thomas explain this? He argues that choosing evil implies a lack of freedom. Humans always want what is good, but because we have free will, we also have the possibility of choosing evil, or “wavering before evil”. Because this state is dynamic, humans are drawn more and more toward evil. Regardless of freedom, man is drawn toward evil. Since the human will can be inclined toward evil as well as toward good, it is natural for the will to waver. That’s why Thomas emphasized “reason,” and especially “right reason,” as a level above the will. According to his theory, acts are the result of the joint action of will and reason, and acts are considered good or bad depending on how rational they are and how much they lack the order of reason. In other words, acts done in accordance with reason are considered moral, while acts based on irrational impulses are considered immoral.

The ethics of Petrus Abaelardus

Petrus Abaelardus saw all actions as value-neutral, so what is the evil we see? As mentioned earlier, the existence of evil is not necessarily evil. Violence is an “existence of evil,” but we can’t value it as evil in and of itself. Also, because of our ignorance, we can’t know if an act leads to good. So how do we evaluate an act? Petrus says it’s in the intention, because we can invariably tell whether an actor has good or evil intentions. For example, a woman likes a man. They get married, but the man turns out to be the woman’s cousin. As a result, the woman is in an incestuous marriage. In this case, according to Petrus, the act cannot be said to be evil. The woman did not enter into the incestuous marriage with evil intent because she did not know anything. Here we can see that intention is a state of mind related to “knowledge” (knowing and not knowing). Let’s take the example of violence again. Violence itself is value-neutral. However, if a person commits violence with the intent to injure another person, the evaluation changes. The evil intent to injure makes the act evil. On the other hand, if a person uses violence to save a boy who was being beaten by several people, this is evaluated as a good act because it was done with good intentions. In this way, good intentions can justify prohibited actions. But can evil intentions ruin an otherwise good act? According to Petrus, yes, because he emphasizes intention, and the evaluation of an act depends on intention. For example, a judge punishes a criminal. However, if the judge did not punish the criminal with the good intention of serving justice, but with the evil intention of causing him pain because the criminal was a friend who had been bullying him, then the good act is ruined. Petrus also believed that good intentions are just as praiseworthy as good actions, even if they are not realized in the act. For example, two people intend to build a shelter to help the poor, but the day before, one of them is robbed and is unable to build the shelter, while the other builds it as planned. In this case, it is said that both men can be judged equally good because they both had good intentions. If so, then evil intentions should be just as condemnable as evil actions. But why do humans punish acts rather than intentions? Because humans are weak, and they view evil acts as worse than evil intentions. Petrus, however, argues for a theory of strict liability (the consequence theory). This theory argues that punishment can be justified even when there is no intent to commit a crime, which at first glance seems like Petrus is favoring consequences. In practice, however, this is not the case. For example, suppose a woman sleeps and unknowingly crushes and kills the infant next to her, but she hasn’t committed a sin because she didn’t know what she was doing (i.e., she didn’t have evil intent to kill). However, according to Petrus, her punishment may be justified. This is because it would serve as a warning to others to be more careful.

Limitations of Petrus Abaelardus’ intention ethics

Petrus Abaelardus argued that intention is an important factor when evaluating the goodness or badness of an action. However, there are limitations to this argument. The first limitation is that it is possible to have a wrong conscience and still be exempt from sin. For example, a man has a belief that having an affair is not a sin, so he commits an affair, and because he has a false conscience that it is not a sin, he cannot be said to have intended it. According to Petrus’s ethics, he is exempt from sin. However, this seems like a loose valuation. The second limitation is that evil means can be justified as long as the intention is good. For example, suppose a person steals to help the poor. According to Petrus, stealing is justified because you had the good intention of “helping the poor”. However, this seems to be a loose way of evaluating an act. Next, we’ll look at the ethics of Thomas Aquinas, compare it to that of Petrus Abaelardus, and see how Thomas Aquinas explains the limitations of Petrus Abaelardus.

Thomas Aquinas’s ethics (with a focus on differences with Petrus Abaelardus)

Thomas Aquinas divided human behavior into three categories in terms of moral evaluation. The first are acts that can be evaluated as good. For example, acts of charity. The second are acts that can be evaluated as evil. For example, rape. The third is neither good nor evil. For example, going for a walk. This illustrates the difference with Petrus’s view of actions. While Petrus views acts as value-neutral, Thomas believes that acts can be evaluated as good or evil. According to Thomas, for an action to be considered morally good, it must satisfy three conditions. First, the act must fall into the category of acts that are not evil. Second, it must be performed under the right circumstances. Third, it must be done with virtuous intentions. If any of these three things are missing, the action becomes evil. Both Thomas and Petrus believe that an act must have a virtuous intention for it to be evaluated as good, but Thomas requires more conditions for it to be evaluated as good than Petrus. Thomas also recognizes that evil intentions can ruin a good act. However, unlike Petrus, he does not believe that good intentions can make an evil act good. For example, Petrus believes that the act of stealing to help the poor cannot be called evil because the intention is good. But Thomas believes that stealing is an evil act that harms someone, and therefore cannot be evaluated as good. If the act itself is evil, regardless of the consequences, then it does not satisfy the first of Thomas’s three conditions. Thomas also requires that the act be performed under appropriate circumstances. For example, suppose a person is near death, and the person watching them prays on the sidelines instead of actually helping them. Praying to God is a good act, but in the context of the person’s situation, it’s hard to evaluate it as good. Similarly, Petrus and Thomas are different in terms of “doing”. Petrus believes that as long as one has good intentions, the act should be evaluated equally even if it is not carried out. Thomas, on the other hand, believes that an act is morally good not only if it is intended to be good, but also if it is carried out under the right circumstances, but that a failure to carry it out that is not voluntary can be excused. In the case of the two men who intended to build the camp in the previous example, one of them is absolved of the sin of not building the camp (of not acting) because he was unlucky (i.e., it was not voluntary).
Next, let’s look at Thomas’s false conscience argument. Thomas argues that we should follow our conscience, even if it is a false conscience. However, it does not always absolve us of sin. If the error is about a fact, and the person was not negligent in finding out the fact, then they can be excused from sin. In other words, if a person does something and is ignorant of the fact that they would not have done it if they had not been ignorant, they cannot be held responsible for the consequences. For example, a man commits an affair without knowing if the woman is married. In such a case, if he had not neglected to make an effort to find out whether she was married, he would be exonerated. However, wrongdoing against divine law cannot absolve a person of sin, i.e., avoidable “not knowing” cannot absolve a person of sin. For example, suppose a man commits rape because he believes that rape is not a sin. According to Petrus, the man is exonerated because he did not have evil intent, but according to Thomas, he is not exonerated because false belief is an offense against divine law.
Thomas said that we must distinguish between foreknowledge and intention. He said that foreknowledge and intention are different, and sometimes unintended consequences can be foreseen. For example, a person walks across a field of rice to get to the market. He knows that he may cause damage to the field, but he does not intend to cause damage. He crosses the field with the evil intention of killing, but the damage to the field is foreseen but not intended. Similarly, there can be unintended but foreseen consequences. However, when an evil act produces an evil result, as in this example, the distinction between foreknowledge and intent is meaningless. Rather, the evil consequences make the evil action more evil. A distinction between foreknowledge and intent is necessary when a good action has a bad outcome. For example, consider killing in self-defense. Self-defense foresees two outcomes. One is the preservation of one’s life, and the other is the death of the attacker. You had the morally good intention of preserving your life, but you didn’t intend for your attacker to die. In this case, the use of reasonable force is permissible, even though the unintended consequence is the death of the attacker. On the other hand, if the killing was intentional, it cannot be reasonable.

Comparing the ethics of Petrus Abaelardus and Thomas Aquinas

Let’s compare them based on intention, act, performance, and consequence. First, both men emphasized the importance of intention: they both emphasized the need to act with good intentions. The difference is that Petrus sees more power in intentions: he believes that if the intention is good, the act can be evaluated as good. Thomas, on the other hand, sees good intentions as a factor in evaluating an action as good.
When it comes to actions, the two disagree. Petrus views acts as value-neutral, and the value of an act depends on the intention. Thomas, on the other hand, categorizes acts into three different categories, and considers good acts to be a factor in being evaluated as good.
In terms of performance, Petrus held that if one has good intentions, one is praiseworthy even if one does not perform them, but Thomas held that even if one has good intentions, one can only be morally good if one performs them in the right circumstances. However, in the case of non-voluntary failure, the sin of not performing an action can be excused.
As for consequences, Petrus held that the goodness or badness of an act is not affected by its consequences, but that punishment can be justified by them. Thomas, on the other hand, believed that when an evil act produces an evil result, the result makes the act more evil, and that when a good act produces a bad result, we must distinguish between intention and foreknowledge. Furthermore, even if an evil act produces a good result, the act itself is evil and cannot be judged as good.

How Thomas Aquinas’s ethics complements Petrus Abaelardus’s limitations

Petrus Abaelardus’ ethics has two limitations. The first is that it is possible to have a false conscience and still be exempt from sin. Thomas distinguishes between two kinds of wrong conscience. The first is wrong about facts, and the second is wrong about divine law. According to Thomas, errors of fact can absolve a person of sin if the person is not negligent in finding out the facts. However, if the error becomes habitual and persists, even an error of fact cannot be forgiven. Wrongdoing against divine law does not absolve sin. Wrongdoing against the divine law is an avoidable “unknowing,” because it is inherent in man and can be judged by reason.
The second limitation is that Petrus’s ethics might seem to suggest that evil means can be justified if the end is good. In response, Thomas argued that it is also important to evaluate the value of the act itself, and that just because the intention is good does not mean that the act itself is good. An act is only morally good if it is performed with good intentions and at the right time. By raising the standard of ‘moral goodness’ higher than Petrus, Thomas compensated for the limitations of Petrus’s intention-centered ethics.