Fifteen years after the introduction of law schools in South Korea, the non-disclosure of bar exam scores has contributed to job market opacity and academic-based hiring. We discuss whether disclosure of bar exam scores can restore fairness and promote the development of law schools.
It has been 15 years since the introduction of law schools. This year, the 14th class of graduates entered the legal market. However, the non-disclosure of bar exam scores and grades continues to make it difficult for graduates to objectively assess their competitiveness as they prepare to enter the workforce. The current legislation that prohibits the disclosure of bar exam scores in principle contributes to the opacity of the job market for law students. In this article, I will criticize the current system of bar exam score nondisclosure and discuss why it is an unreasonable policy.
Article 18 of the Bar Examination Act, which was enacted in 2009 when the law school was launched, required that candidates be informed of their scores upon request. However, just two years later, in 2011, the Bar Examination Act was amended to prohibit the disclosure of scores to anyone except those who failed the exam. In other words, the law on bar score disclosure was reversed before the first bar exam was even taken. There are several ostensible rationales for keeping bar exam scores private. First, there is a concern that releasing scores would turn law school education into a test-driven education that, like the bar exam, would result in a hierarchy of passersby. The second argument is that the purpose of law schools, which is to produce talented individuals with expertise and competitiveness in various fields through specialized education, will be difficult to achieve, and that disclosure of grades may lead to stratification of universities and excessive competition among universities. In the following discussion, we will refute these arguments and present a rationale for disclosing grades.
First of all, in the absence of objective indicators to measure lawyers’ abilities, the non-disclosure of bar exam grades has led to unfair factors such as education, family background, and connections becoming important factors in the appointment of judges and prosecutors and the hiring of large law firms. In fact, the story of a student who was scheduled to be hired by a major Korean law firm, which I mentioned in the introduction as an example, failed the bar exam and lost out, not only this year, but every year. As mentioned in the introduction, a student who fails the bar exam, which is passed by more than 60% of all candidates, is pre-employed by a law firm that hires only a few dozen students from law schools across the country, which is enough to make one wonder whether law firms are considering not only ability but also background when hiring talent. In other words, it’s time for a debate about the extent to which the education, GPA, and other factors currently considered by law firms in hiring are correlated with the bar exam, which determines whether a person is qualified to become a lawyer. In addition, statistics released in 2013 on the results of the Ministry of Justice’s appointment of prosecutors among the first batch of law school graduates show that 85.7% of the so-called SKY universities were appointed as prosecutors, compared to the proportion of SKY universities (64%) among the prosecutors appointed in 2010-2012. Even in the top six law firms, including Kim & Chang, Pacific, and Kwangjang, 81% of lawyers were graduates of SKY Law School.
It is clear that the secrecy of grades does not prevent the hierarchization of universities, but rather serves as a factor to further consolidate the academic cartel. Considering that under the bar examination system, grades on the bar examination and performance in training centers were the most objective and valid criteria for appointment as a judge or prosecutor and employment at large law firms, regardless of the undergraduate school of origin, the current system contradicts the purpose of introducing law schools, which is to make the university’s signature more important than the bar examination.
Second, there is currently a rigid hierarchy among law schools across the country. Students applying to law school are also choosing their schools based on that hierarchy. This is where another problem arises with the non-disclosure of bar exam scores. While this is similar to the situation where high school graduates choose a college based on the SATs and have a set hierarchy of colleges, it is different from the bar exam. In the case of the bar exam, students who completed 60 credits of law courses were eligible to take the exam on an equal footing regardless of their school or faculty, and their scores were publicly available. While it is not to say that their backgrounds were not taken into account in subsequent hiring, their performance on the bar exam and their performance during the judicial training program could be used as an objective competitive indicator for those whose backgrounds were less favorable. On the other hand, under the current system, where bar exam scores are not publicly available, there is no other indicator for those from disadvantaged backgrounds, and if there is little possibility of free competition among them, it is difficult to expect progress within them. As a result, the higher-ranked schools are likely to become complacent, and the lower-ranked schools are likely to become discouraged. Under the current policy of non-disclosure of bar exam scores, students from relatively low-ranked law schools are unlikely to be able to make any significant advancement in the legal market after graduation, and the above situation is repeated year after year. In this situation, the disclosure of bar exam scores could be a new stimulus for both schools and students, and could have a positive effect on the legal profession as a whole.
The first issue that comes to mind is the education within law schools. According to opponents of bar score disclosure, if bar scores were made public, which are currently private, law school education and student learning would be centered around bar exam subjects. This would be contrary to the purpose of law schools, which is to produce talented and competitive lawyers with expertise in various fields through specialized education. In other words, there is a risk that law schools will be transformed into cram schools for the bar exam. In particular, the majority of professors in law schools are opposed to the idea of disclosing bar exam scores, and their arguments are strengthened by the fact that under the current system, three years of law school credits are highly influential in the job market, and therefore students are highly invested in their education and professors’ authority.
However, under the current system, many law students use their vacations to take courses at law schools to prepare for the bar exam, or use online courses to continue their education during the semester. In other words, their argument is not necessarily correct, given the inefficiency of having a completely separate classroom for credit management and studying for the bar exam. In addition, due to the nature of law subjects, each professor has his or her own opinion on the majority and minority theories, so it is very difficult for students to write an answer that satisfies the professor’s taste when it comes to credit management. In addition, due to some professors’ egos, there are many cases where students learn things that are not relevant to the practice of law after graduation. Therefore, it can be concluded that this is not a strong enough argument in favor of non-disclosure of bar exam scores.
Finally, I would like to discuss the concern that some opponents have expressed about the hierarchization of universities and excessive competition among universities as a result of grade disclosure. If lawyers’ grades are made public, it is natural that there will be some disparity between schools. The logic is that there will be a hierarchy of law schools based on the grades disclosed, and there will be excessive competition to improve that hierarchy. In other words, when entering the job market after graduating from law school, there will be another influential indicator, and it will have a negative effect on the status of each school.
However, it is no secret that the ranking of law schools is tacitly established whether or not the exam is publicized. While bar passage rates are published annually, school-specific passage rates are meaningless in an exam that passes more than 60% of all candidates. Rather than entering the job market with a fixed ranking at the time of admission, it would be beneficial for schools to be able to compete in a more fluid situation where bar exam performance can change. In other words, the reorganization of school hierarchies and increased competition resulting from bar score disclosure is likely to be net positive in the long run.
As we enter the fifteenth year of law school and the bar score disclosure debate continues to rage, I conclude by reiterating my belief that bar score disclosure is not an option, but a necessity, if law school is to serve its purpose of preparing lawyers from a broader and more diverse range of disciplines and walks of life, and if the nation’s accredited law schools are to evolve rather than remain stagnant together.
