Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions argues that scientific knowledge does not simply accumulate, but rather develops revolutionarily through paradigm shifts. Kuhn’s theory has been controversial from both a positivist and relativist perspective and has led to a new debate in philosophy of science about the search for truth.
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962, is a bestseller that is considered a must-read science classic despite its age. It is argued that Kuhn made a major mark on the philosophy of science in the 20th century with his claim that scientific knowledge does not develop by mere accumulation, but revolutionarily through paradigm shifts. His paradigm theory, which was groundbreaking at the time, has since been a major influence on the many competing theories of ‘truth’, especially for those who hold a relativistic view of science. In this article, we’ll consider Kuhn’s paradigm theory versus the relativistic position. First, we’ll explain Kuhn’s paradigm theory, then look at the positivistic and relativistic views of science, and then consider whether his theory is really a relativistic view.
As I said in the introduction, Thomas Kuhn’s argument is that scientific knowledge develops as a result of radical scientific revolutions. If we liken it to a building under construction, when a limit or crisis comes along, the old building collapses and a new one is built in a new way. The root of the word paradeigma is an example or model. It’s not without ambiguity, as it’s the first time we’re defining a concept that wasn’t previously used in the history of science, but Thomas Kuhn defines a paradigm as “an aggregate set of beliefs, values, skills, etc. shared by its members. While paradigms have since been subdivided and the concept continues to be revisited, for the purposes of this article, we’ll use a flexible, holistic understanding of paradigm.
Kuhn suggests that scientific knowledge goes through the following process: normal science → crisis → revolution → normal science. Let’s use the concept of paradigm to understand this: when a paradigm is well accepted, a group is in a state of steady state science. When newly discovered facts are solved within the paradigm and intractable problems emerge, the paradigm enters a crisis. When the experts within the paradigm work hard to solve the problem, but the crisis doesn’t end, a new paradigm emerges and we have a scientific revolution. When the new paradigm is well accepted again, we return to the state of normal science.
Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory has received a lot of criticism since its publication, and one of the things that has puzzled me is the vagueness of the criteria for choosing or accepting a new paradigm. Suppose, as Kuhn claims, there is a paradigm crisis and a new paradigm is needed. If two scientists present paradigms A and B, each of which can explain phenomena that are not explained by existing knowledge and the existing paradigm O, what criteria should a group of scientists use to choose between the two paradigms? It is clear that paradigms A and B make more sense than paradigm O because they can explain new phenomena. But how can a group of scientists who were part of paradigm O decide which of paradigms A and B is more rational than paradigm O? Rationality isn’t a good enough criterion because we can’t casually compare the logical consistency or check the predictive power of a paradigm as it changes, not just to the extent that the hypothesis collapses. After all, accepting a paradigm inevitably involves irrational factors, such as personal beliefs or unverifiable intuitions. It may seem strange to deal with irrational factors in science, but relativism makes sense.
If you’re even remotely interested in philosophy, you’re likely to hear words like positivism and relativism thrown around. It’s a lot to explain, but a simple way to think about it is that a positivistic view of science is one that rejects metaphysical ideas and emphasizes the search for truth. It seeks to arrive at absolute truth through objective criteria, such as logic and math. Positivism can also be used interchangeably with realism in the sciences, which arose as an antithesis to nominalism. Realism is the assertion that objects are independent of subjectivity, and when applied to science, the ultimate goal of science is to find the object, or truth, independent of the subjectivity of the investigator, and science is the pursuit of that truth. In this context, I think the two positions can be used interchangeably, so it is convenient to think of positivism as a ‘truth-seeking position’ like realism. On the other hand, in a relativistic scientific view, there is no absolute truth. While scientists with a positivist view of science may be unhappy with the irrationality of determining and following a paradigm, it is perfectly acceptable to scientists with a relativist view of science. This line of thinking might lead one to believe that Kuhn is a relativist, and that the question of whether paradigm theory is correct or incorrect is a battle between the positivist and relativist views. However, we know from Kuhn’s own writings that he rejected and disliked being a relativist, so we need to ask whether or not Kuhn really had a relativistic view of science.
If I had to pick a chapter where Kuhn’s relativistic tendencies are most evident and controversial, it would be Progress through Revolution. According to Kuhn, the history of science consists of normal science and scientific revolutions. Positivism believes that science progresses toward truth within its own domain, but according to Kuhn, progress occurs through scientific revolutions. With each paradigm shift, theories change and knowledge is not accumulated, so there is no truth, which can be thought of as relativism. So there is room to say that Kuhn is a relativist who does not seek truth. But we can also interpret this differently. I think that just as positivists progress toward truth within their domain, something similar enough can happen within normal science. I see a parallel between positivists progressing toward universal truths and normal science refining and developing its paradigms, except that in the case of revolutions, as the book’s introduction puts it, we might say that we progress by breaking away from the old way of thinking about the world. Whereas positivists progress by moving toward universal truths that have already been determined, Kuhn’s progress is about moving through multiple worlds and refining theories within one world. I don’t think Kuhn was not searching for truth, of course, because he didn’t follow the absolute universal truth that positivists do, but he explored the possibility that each paradigm is not just a theory that explains phenomena, but that each paradigm can also strive for truth, even if it is not universal in the state of normal science.
The implications of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions for the philosophy of science in the 20th century are significant. It gave a big boost to relativism, which is why it pitted traditional logical positivism against the new relativism, but Kuhn himself seems to have found it ironic and amusing that the relativists were unhappy about his arguments being appropriated and sociologized.
