This is a philosophical debate about whether humans have free will, centered on the conflict between religious and materialistic views of human nature. The anti-free will argument discusses whether choices are predetermined or random, and provides a comprehensive review that takes into account advances in modern neuroscience and ethical and legal issues.
There are two different views of human nature. According to the religious view of humanity, humans have a non-physical entity, the soul, in addition to a physical entity, the body. The soul is completely distinct from the physical body and is the source of human decisions. On the other hand, according to the materialistic view of humanity, humans are nothing more than physical bodies. There is no soul outside of the physical body, so human decisions are just neural events in the brain. Given the materialistic view of human beings, can humans make free choices, i.e., do humans have free will? For example, let’s say Guy opens the refrigerator door and sees only strawberry milk and chocolate milk. Can he freely choose one of them?
In response to this question, the anti-free will argument concludes that Gu does not have free will. First of all, a random choice is either predetermined by previous events or it happens randomly. In this case, randomly means not predetermined. With this premise, the anti-free will argument considers both the predetermination and randomness assumptions. First, let’s assume that a random choice is predetermined by the events that precede it. The anti-free will argument concludes that we don’t have free will in this case. For example, if Guy’s choice of strawberry milk was predetermined before he was even born, it would be hard to believe that he chose it out of free will. Second, suppose the choice was made at random. The anti-free will argument concludes that we don’t have free will in this case either. For example, if Kwak’s choice of strawberry milk was just a random neural event in his brain, it would be hard to see it as a product of free will.
However, there are various criticisms of this argument. One criticism of the anti-free will argument argues that while we should accept the conclusion of the anti-free will argument given the predetermination assumption, we should not accept the conclusion given the randomization assumption. Therefore, we should not accept the conclusion of the anti-free will argument either. The reasons are as follows
For a random choice to be a product of my free will, it must fulfill both of the following conditions. First, I must be the agent of the choice. Second, my choice must not be predetermined by prior events. However, if a choice is pre-determined by prior events, then it conflicts with the second condition for free will. So we have to accept the conclusion of the anti-free will argument’s predetermination assumption: we don’t have free will. Of course, it is possible to have free will in a different sense than this. If by “I freely chose” we mean merely desire-fulfilling free will, where I did what I wanted to do, then my choice could be the product of my free will, whether or not it was predetermined by prior events. But this kind of free will is different from the kind of free will that satisfies both of the conditions we have in mind here.
Next, even if a choice is random, I can still be the subject of that choice. According to the materialist view of human beings, “Guy chose strawberry milk” means that “a neural event occurred in Guy’s brain at the time of the choice”. Suppose that these neural events were not pre-determined by previous events. Under this assumption, he can still be the agent of the choice. This assumption does not change the fact that “he chose strawberry milk” as a neural event in his brain that occurred at the time of choice. In the end, the conclusions of the anti-free will argument do not have to be accepted given the random assumptions.
To better understand this debate, we need to consider the various research findings and philosophical positions that support a materialist view of humanity. For example, modern advances in neuroscience have provided a detailed description of how human decision-making processes are linked to neural activity in the brain. Some studies show that activity in specific brain regions can predict human choices and behavior. These studies provide important clues for understanding free will from a materialist perspective. On the other hand, there is still much discussion about how these neuroscientific explanations can be reconciled with human empirical free will.
Furthermore, the debate about free will is not just a philosophical one; it is also closely related to ethical and legal issues. If humans don’t have free will in the true sense of the word, this would have profound implications for the concepts of responsibility and punishment. For example, if criminals did not freely choose their actions, but were merely the result of neural events in the brain, how could their punishment be justified? These questions suggest that the free will debate can extend beyond philosophical arguments to social and moral issues.
In the end, the free will debate requires a deep understanding of human nature, which must be explored from a variety of philosophical, scientific, and ethical perspectives. While materialist and religious views of human nature have different starting points, they all play an important role in the effort to explore the nature of human existence. In doing so, we can gain a deeper understanding of what it means to be human and what it means to live as a human being.
