Criticizes unrealistic views and emotional debates about human cloning and emphasizes the importance of a technical and objective approach. It argues that unrealistic assumptions and emotional debates hinder technological progress and that moral issues should be addressed through objective and realistic discussions.
Human Cloning: What’s at Stake provides an overview of the success of the Dolly the sheep experiment and the debate surrounding the possibility of human cloning, as well as the different perspectives and practical sanctions. More than a decade after its publication, the book’s content is still relevant to the debate, even from a modern perspective, where the antipathy and fear of somatic cell cloning has been somewhat diluted and we can maintain an objective view of the technology. Therefore, in this article, I would like to approach the discussion of human cloning from two perspectives. The first is a critique of the unrealistic way in which human cloning is viewed, and the second is the validity of emotional arguments against human cloning. Along the way, we will also discuss what kind of logic it is reasonable to aim for in opposing human cloning.
The most common mistake that people outside of science and technology, especially in ethics and law, make when looking at human cloning is to think of it in terms of images from fiction and fantasy, especially eugenics, rather than in terms of science and technology. These imaginative discussions of human cloning inevitably lead to assumptions that are highly unlikely to be realized, and these discussions, and the issues that arise from them, obscure what we should really be discussing: the moral discussion of the technical realm of what can be done. This book, which covers a wide range of areas and diverse perspectives, suffers from similar problems.
The most common and recurring unrealistic argument is the eugenic, or human improvement, concern about human cloning. For many members of the public, the concept of human cloning has been accepted through popular media as a creative work before it has been approached and accepted scientifically. Against this backdrop, many non-scientific scholars tend to view human cloning technology as a divine technology, or a bridgehead to it, where we can modify and manipulate genes to our will. Leon Kass’s ‘The Wisdom of Disgust’ portrays the cloned child as a ‘need-gratifying child’ and a bridgehead to narcissistic reinvention and control of the future, and the NBAC’s Human Cloning Report also views the cloned child as an easy target for eugenics.
However, the progress of somatic cell cloning research to date suggests that this may be very unrealistic. There is no doubt that social and ethical resistance has played a large role in the lack of progress, and the fact that modern genetic engineering research is largely focused on research that does not require embryos via stem cells may also be a factor in the lack of progress. But apart from that, eugenic human cloning, a combination of somatic cell cloning and genetic engineering, remains a pipe dream even now that human cloning is theoretically possible, and even if it were possible, the assumption that genes play a dominant role in the expression of human traits is far from certain. If identity depends on life experience as well as genetic traits, as Philip Kitcher argues in Whose Self Is This, then it is also unclear whether genes would have a significant impact on the expression of uniquely human traits beyond some simple traits (eye color, hair color). In the extreme case, a society of only cloned humans could form an independent society with individualized personalities based on their living environment.
Many of these discussions are based on unproven or unproven scientific premises, which only add to the fear of human cloning. It prevents us from making objective judgments about the practical limits of current human cloning technologies and how far they can go. In the absence of such objective judgment, the debate slips back into a state of anxiety, where objectivity is lost, and ultimately becomes unconvincing.
Of course, human cloning has the potential to cause a variety of side effects if it were to be realized. But the more the debate is based on a fundamental aversion to the idea of human cloning, cloaked in rhetoric about so-called “ethical values” and the “significance of human existence,” without an objective assessment of these side effects and their benefits, the less room there is for human cloning technology to be used without side effects or under a dispassionate judgment. Regardless of the rights or wrongs of human cloning, such attitudes in the face of a new technology only hinder productive and objective judgment and feed preconceived notions about the technology.
In this context, another mistake that opponents of human cloning often make is to cloud their arguments with emotional arguments that are presented as if they were objective facts or truths. While such emotional arguments can be effective in persuading an opponent or the public, it is a separate discussion whether it is acceptable to base judgments about a technology and its ethical issues on emotion.
Many parts of the text take issue with viewing human cloning in terms of utility, citing the objectification of human beings and the loss of unique human meaning as the main reasons. However, if we dig deeper into these discussions, we can see that they ultimately converge on a question of emotional and subjective morality. James D. Watson’s “The Move Toward Cloned Humans: Is This What We Want?” argues against asexually reproducing humans on the grounds that it would compromise individual uniqueness and the parent-child bond, but it is based on public disappointment and disgust. Leon Kass’s “The Wisdom of Disgust” fails to explain the reasons for the intrinsic revulsion felt toward human cloning, but likens it to the inability to give a good reason for abhorring incest, and takes it as a repulsion and instinctive warning against excessive human manipulation. He also characterizes human cloning as a violation of nature, a departure from the natural human way, and so on, and builds his argument on a subjective assignment of value to nature and nature.
This is not to say that those who oppose human cloning cannot emotionally sympathize with this debate. In fact, from the perspective of an opponent of human cloning, it seems like the most natural and prioritized discussion. However, I would like to propose that we take emotion out of the process of arguing against human cloning. Appealing to the emotional realm can be more persuasive than any other argument, and sometimes there are issues that require it. However, in the case of human cloning, the lack of objective judgment about the technology, coupled with the first point above, makes it easy for distorted emotions to take over, with fears of a technology that has yet to arrive and concerns about the side effects of an unknown technology, rather than objective emotional appeals about human cloning itself. Even if we can, after much thought and anguish, manage to speak and argue without such distortions, we cannot change the minds of the recipients of our arguments, so even if we assume that we can make an appeal based on purely moral feelings without distortions, it is unrealistic to expect that from the readers of our arguments. In this context, at the very least, I would argue that emotional discussions about human cloning are likely to lead to a discussion that is so subjective and devoid of substance that they should be reserved until the technology actually arrives.
So, what does a legitimate argument against human cloning need to be? First and foremost, we need to objectively look at the technology of human cloning before we can oppose it. Instead of looking at human cloning as a subjective and emotional issue, or as an object of unrealized fear, we should approach it as a technology that can actually be realized, so that we can make a cold judgment about the extent to which genetic manipulation and human cloning are technically feasible and limit our discussion to that. In this way, we can set appropriate limits on the discussion of human cloning, focus our attention on more important issues, and stop thinking about unrealistic assumptions that will never materialize.
Once we have set the limits of the discussion, we can then work to calculate and justify the risks of human cloning based on more objective and realistic possibilities. Rather than continuing to argue that human cloning simply destroys social values and triggers our fears and disgust, we can remain persuasive by discussing the physical burdens and risks to egg donors, mothers, and fetuses alike, as in the NBAC’s Human Cloning report, or by examining the potential for human cloning to be misused in a variety of contexts, as in Philip Kitcher’s Whose Self Is It?
The debate about human cloning is essentially a debate about the legitimacy of a technology that doesn’t exist. It is not easy to discuss the technical limitations of a technology that has not yet been created, so the discussion tends to be based on the images and ideas in our minds, making unrealistic possibilities that are not objective seem feasible. However, this kind of discussion can sometimes leave us unprepared for when the technology actually arrives, by highlighting some of the fantasies that we believed could be realized, and overshadowing the discussions about what could be realized and what we should have really been discussing and thinking about. That’s why we need to set clear practical limits on the yet-to-be-realized technology of human cloning. Within these limits, we should first try to examine the various possibilities, make objective estimates of the problems that might arise in some of the more likely cases, and consider solutions and countermeasures, as well as the moral issues that these possibilities might raise. On this basis, we will be better prepared to make judgments about what is “right” and “moral” about human cloning when the technology becomes feasible and available to all.
