Richard Dawkins’ theory of selfish genetics is effective in explaining reciprocal altruism in animals, but game theory is inadequate because it does not take into account the irrational behavior of animals. This essay analyzes the differences between these two theories and reveals the limitations of game theory in explaining animal behavior.
Introduction
In his book The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins proposes the selfish gene theory to explain the principles of evolution based on the selfishness of genes. According to the selfish gene theory, genes are the agents of evolution, and their goal is to replicate themselves and spread over a long period of time. Genes use individuals, which are survival machines, as a means to achieve their goal, and the behavior of individuals that we can observe with our eyes can be explained through the selfishness of genes. Dawkins also explains reciprocal altruism, the act of helping each other out among animals that belong to the same species but are not related to each other, through the selfish gene theory. But in the same book, he also explains reciprocal altruism among the same animals through game theory. His intention is to explain the competition between animal individuals as a game between individuals, using genes as the same concept as humans in general game theory.
Game theory is a theory that helps a lot in predicting and implementing interdependent decision-making, and it explains how participants in a game who are seeking their own self-interest end up engaging in reciprocal altruistic behavior that benefits each other. As such, it seems like a very similar theory to selfish genetics. However, in the games that game theory deals with, actors have a strategy and play to maximize their utility, whereas animals do not behave rationally in the same way that humans do. This makes game theory inappropriate to apply to animal interactions in the first place. In this essay, I will show that there are more differences than similarities between selfish genetics and game theory, and that it is not appropriate to apply game theory to explain reciprocal altruism in animals.
The Problem with Using Dawkins’ Selfish Genetics and Game Theory to Explain and Explain Animal Reciprocal Cooperative Behavior
The problem with Dawkins’s use of game theory to explain reciprocal altruism is that it is not a common phenomenon. Reciprocal altruism is a concept commonly used to explain unusual behaviors between individuals of different species. According to Robert Trivers, the founder of the theory, animals’ sociality evolved through the act of helping others in anticipation of future reciprocation, rather than in the moment. This dimensional explanation can be applied to acts of kindness and reciprocation between individuals of the same species, even if they are not related. A classic example is a bird and a vampire bat swatting aphids off each other’s backs, where each member of the same species performs a specific act to benefit the other and expects the other to reciprocate in some way.
Dawkins’s selfish gene theory suggests that genes are the agents of evolution, and that individual genes guide the behavior of individuals in ways that ensure the continued survival of their own kind. This is at first glance at odds with reciprocal altruism, in which individuals of the same species but not related to each other engage in helpful behavior. This is because, according to the selfish gene theory, the same genes give them a reason to help, even if they belong to different survival machines.
Tribus’s reciprocal altruism is “altruism,” but only in the sense that it expects acts of kindness to be reciprocated. It is possible to help other species because there is something to be gained in return. Suppose an individual performs an act of kindness to another individual that could be described as reciprocal altruism. The recipient of the act of kindness is helped to survive by the other, and there are two possible behaviors: reciprocating or not reciprocating. If the recipient reciprocates, there’s no problem, but if the recipient doesn’t reciprocate, the individual who performed the act of kindness first, based on reciprocal altruism, is at an evolutionary disadvantage. However, as Williams points out, reciprocal altruism is based on the ability to recognize animals, so it’s possible to go a step further and recognize if the other person reciprocates your initial act of kindness. In this situation, if there are individuals that do not reciprocate secondary acts of kindness, they will have a relative advantage over individuals controlled by genes that are incapable of reciprocating, and eventually, combinations that allow for both acts of kindness and reciprocation will win the competition. Dawkins calls a gene that remembers an unreciprocated act of kindness and then no longer performs it “the grudger,” and this strategy of the grudger can be recognized as an example of an ESS because it always puts the grudger in an advantageous position, regardless of whether other types of genes emerge: genes that perform acts of kindness regardless of reciprocation or genes that do not perform acts of kindness regardless of reciprocation. In such a system where the grudge wins, reciprocal altruism naturally leads to symbiotic relationships, and many examples have been observed.
Having explained reciprocal altruism in terms of selfish genetics, Dawkins goes on to apply game theory to achieve the same goal. Reciprocal altruism is analogous to a game in which two prisoners each have two options: to cooperate or to betray. Dawkins argues that game theory, the study of what strategies a prisoner should take in order to gain an advantage, can be applied to explain reciprocal altruism. The situation is called a “prisoner’s dilemma” because, from each prisoner’s perspective, playing the betrayal card is a rational strategy, but both prisoners know that they will be fined or have a low payoff if they play a rational strategy, and both prisoners know that they will have a high payoff if they cooperate. In a simple Prisoner’s Dilemma game, there is no way to verify trust, and the game is destined to end in mutual betrayal with bad consequences for both prisoners. However, if the prisoner’s dilemma is repeated, the situation is different. According to Dawkins, two entities in a reciprocal altruistic relationship are playing a game of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in that they can choose to perform acts of kindness and reciprocate acts of kindness, or not, and they can make these choices repeatedly over time. In a one-time game, betrayal is the most profitable strategy, but in a repeated game, there are many possible strategies, and to find out which of the possible strategies is the most profitable, Axelrod took the proposed strategies, translated them into a common programming language, and pitted them against each other. The winning strategy is called Tit for Tat (TFT), which means that the first game starts with cooperation, after which the most favorable strategy is to simply mimic the opponent’s moves. It’s very similar to “grudge,” where your opponent’s cooperation in the last game determines whether or not you cooperate in the next game. TFT is not exactly an ESS because a strategy of always being kind can be naturally incorporated into a system based on TFT. However, given that it is immune to the intrusion of betrayal and retaliation strategies, a hybrid strategy of basically being kind and using TFT when appropriate can be considered an ESS. Since the “grudge matcher” nature of reciprocal altruism can be explained by game theory and TFT, it seems at first glance to recognize game theory as a tool for understanding reciprocal altruism. In a repetitive game, the team that always cooperates is the one that is best suited to survive because it has the most to gain, and so it evolves to behave in this reciprocal altruistic manner. In other words, Dawkins uses game theory to explain that altruistic species arise because those who behave suboptimally have the greatest probability (or expectation) of passing on their genes.
Similarities and differences between selfish genetics and game theory
It would seem that both selfish genetics and game theory can be applied to explain reciprocal altruism. However, if we take a closer look at the conditions under which each theory can hold, we realize that there are significant differences between the two. Since there is no doubt that reciprocal altruism is a product of evolution, we will apply selfish genetics and game theory to standard evolutionary stages and analyze their similarities and differences.
Evolution is a four-step process of gene duplication, mutation, competition, and selection. Genes are duplicated over many, many generations, and in the process, new genes arise due to chance mutations. As the diversity in the gene pool increases, genes compete with each other for dominance, and natural selection selects certain genes. Similarly, in the case of reciprocal altruism, assuming that all individuals were uncooperative, chance mutations led to the emergence of cooperative individuals, and since cooperative individuals are better suited to survive, they were selected by nature to cooperate. Since the existing genes were present in the initial generation, as genes replicate over generations, they mutate for various reasons, and new genes arise that can win through reciprocal altruism, such as the “grudge match” according to selfish genetics. The existing genes and the mutated genes then compete in the gene pool, and the survival machines controlled by the “grudge” have an advantage in reciprocal altruistic relationships with other individuals (for the reasons mentioned above) and gain an advantage over time. This means that the chances of genetic dependence increase, and the genes that win the competition are naturally selected.
While the selfish gene theory certainly discusses the “selfishness” of genes, it is always for ease of explanation and does not involve any rational being in the process of mutation and selection. In other words, the process of mutation in the gene pool, the process of competition between genes, and the process of selection is based on chance, not on the rational thinking of someone. It is called “selfish genetics” because the evolutionary process of genes as units seems to be driven by their selfishness, but it is basically named based on the common sense assumption that genes cannot think for themselves.
Game theory, on the other hand, can be applied to reciprocal altruism in animals, assuming that animals are rational and can make thoughtful choices about whether to cooperate or betray. It also requires that these strategies are well thought out and executed by the animals, so that they win the competition and are selected. Regardless of whether you use selfish genetics or game theory to explain reciprocal altruism in animals, the conclusions are similar in light of the similarities between The Grudge and TFT. However, the conditions under which each can be applied are different, and in particular, selfish genetics can explain the mutation and selection phase of evolution well, whereas game theory requires a leap of logic and is therefore not an appropriate application.
Why game theory cannot be applied to animal reciprocal altruism
When it comes to explaining reciprocal altruism in animals, selfish genetics is well suited to the mechanistic world of animals. Game theory, on the other hand, suggests that, rather than evolutionary “natural selection,” actors predict the outcomes of their actions and choose because the outcomes of their choices benefit them. The problem is that the actors here are non-rational animals, so they can’t predict outcomes and create strategies in the first place. On the surface, it may appear that the animal is thinking and acting strategically, but this is only the result of the genes that have been selected for and allowed to exist in the animal through competition. Therefore, it is fundamentally impossible to use game theory to explain reciprocal altruism in animals, and we should be careful not to commit this argumentative fallacy when discussing evolution in the future.
The selfish gene theory of evolution was considered highly revolutionary at the time of its publication and has been attacked from many angles. From another angle, selfish genetics is a theory that has been quite influential and compelling. Since The Selfish Gene, Dawkins has written about his views on evolution in numerous books, and whether you like his theories or not, he is one of the leading animal behaviorists and evolutionary biologists of our time. As a popular and authoritative scientist, his theories and explanations should be treated with more caution, and this essay will critically examine the application of game theory to reciprocal altruism in animals.
