This article discusses the issue of distinguishing science from non-science in order to understand the nature of science, and explores the definition and limits of science through the lens of logical realism and Karl Popper’s disproversialism. While Popper’s disproversialism is a valid criterion for distinguishing between science and non-science, it suggests that even unprovable theories can have a scientific character through new interpretations.
What is science? Philosophers of science and scientists have long struggled to define the discipline they study. Defining science is more than just describing its concepts; it’s about establishing criteria that distinguish science from non-science. In this process, we naturally come to understand the nature of science. The essence of science is a system of knowledge based on objective facts and experience. But how can we accurately define the nature of science? In the philosophy of science, the criteria that distinguish science from non-science play a key role in defining science. This discussion is called the “problem of compartmentalization,” and was first raised by positivists and German philosophers in the 19th century. In the 20th century, the debate between the logical realists and Karl Popper brought the issue to the forefront.
In this article, we will briefly review the position of the logical realists, and then see how Karl Popper refuted their position and constructed his own anti-proofist logic. We will also discuss the limitations of this anti-proofism. In the process, we will go beyond the question of what is science and what is not, and come to a deeper understanding of what science is.
Logical realism is a philosophical movement that emerged in the early 20th century, when philosophers impressed by the leaps and bounds of the natural sciences sought to incorporate them into philosophy. Their main argument was that for a proposition to have meaning, it must be verifiable by experiment. This principle of verifiability resonated strongly in philosophical circles at the time, and metaphysical questions and arguments were considered meaningless because they were not verifiable. As a result, philosophy sought to transform itself into a system of meaningful propositions that could be verified by experiment. In doing so, the boundaries between science and non-science were clarified, and a new understanding of the nature of scientific truth became possible. However, because logical positivism relied on an inductive methodology, it was eventually challenged by Karl Popper’s antipositivism.
Karl Popper’s disproversialism helped to reorganize the core of the scientific method. Popper argued that science should not rely on inductive logic. Inductive reasoning is the process of deriving general laws from many empirical examples, but there are logical limits to this process. Popper referred to this as the “problem of induction,” emphasizing that the claim that a scientific theory is true cannot be fully justified by empirical examples. For example, the fact that we observe the sun rising every day does not guarantee that it will rise tomorrow. This problem is also not solved by the concept of probability introduced by logical realists. In the end, Popper found the essence of scientific truth in its disprovability: for a theory to be called scientific, it must have the potential to be disproved.
This logic of disprovability provided Popper with the criteria for distinguishing science from non-science, but his approach had its limitations. Popper developed his philosophical views while studying mathematics in Austria and interacting with the great minds of physics. In particular, he was impressed by Einstein’s theory of general relativity, which he used to clarify the boundaries between science and non-science. He saw Einstein’s theory as an example of true science because it was so specific and disprovable. On the other hand, Popper criticized Freud’s psychoanalysis and Marxist historical theory, arguing that they were pseudoscience that could not be disproved.
However, Popper’s approach was likely subjective. As a young man, he was fascinated by the theories of Freud and Marx, but instead of finding acceptance among their followers, he experienced opposition. This experience left a scar on Popper, and he later became more critical of these theories. Based on this personal experience, Popper applied the principle of disprovability too strictly, ruling out the possibility that Freud’s and Marx’s theories could be scientific.
However, even theories that were considered unprovable could be given scientific status in modern times through new interpretations. For example, Lacan’s critical inheritance of Freud’s theories, or Althusser’s reinterpretation of Marxism, opened up the possibility of scientific interpretations of theories that Popper had deemed unscientific based on the criteria of disprovability. Lacan reinterpreted Freud’s theories as disprovable structures, and Althusser’s emphasis on the scientificity of Marxism shed new light on them.
In conclusion, science is not limited to the natural sciences, but is a universal methodology that can be applied to humanistic theories as well. While it is clear that the criterion of disprovability is an important factor in distinguishing science from non-science, the scope of science can vary depending on how this criterion is applied. Therefore, when discussing the definition of science, we should not simply rely on disprovability, but also consider the various possibilities and potentials of a theory. This will allow science to break down boundaries with other disciplines and pave the way for a broader range of academic inquiry.
