While identitarianism and functionalism attempt to explain consciousness as a material state or function of the brain, Rowlands’ extended cognition theory argues that consciousness and cognitive processes are shaped by interactions with the external environment.
In psychological philosophy, identitarianism views consciousness as identical to the material state of the brain. By equating consciousness with the physical state of the brain, identificationism argues that a particular brain state corresponds to a particular state of consciousness. Functionalism, on the other hand, argues that consciousness is a function, and that the same function can be realized in different materials. A function is defined as a functional role that produces a specific output given some input, and functional role matching means that pairs of inputs and outputs match. For example, if a robot composed of silicon chips has the function of producing pain as an output in response to an input of being stabbed, then the robot and we have the same consciousness. In this way, functionalism holds that it doesn’t matter what material embodies consciousness.
Functionalism tries to explain the nature of consciousness through various examples. For example, while the human brain is composed of biological neurons, the “brain” of an artificial intelligence robot may be composed of silicon chips. However, if they both produce the same output for the same input, i.e., perform the same function, they can be considered to have the same consciousness. From this perspective, functionalism offers a very inclusive approach in that different forms of material embodiment can produce the same mental state.
Searle offers a thought experiment that refutes functionalism. Imagine a “Chinese room” with only one person in it who doesn’t know Chinese, and he produces Chinese input and Chinese output according to a set of rules. According to the theory, the person in the room has the same functional role as a Chinese speaker, but does not know Chinese. This is an example of the limitations of functionalism. This is an example of the limitations of functionalism, emphasizing that consciousness does not exist simply because inputs and outputs are the same.
Both identitarianism and functionalism and their refutations limit the discussion of consciousness to the inside of the body, which embodies consciousness. However, one aspect of consciousness, cognition, or “coming to know something,” occurs in conjunction with events outside the body. For example, you might look up information you don’t remember by looking at a file on your laptop. In this way, cognition is closely tied not only to internal mental processes, but also to external tools and environments. From this perspective, Lawrence’s theory of extended cognition plays an important role in explaining consciousness and cognition.
Lawrence’s theory of extended cognition explains that cognition is a process that creates a “mental state” in the subject. Memories and beliefs are examples of mental states. Mental states represent meaning to the subject without being dependent on anything else. For example, a person who remembers something doesn’t need to rely on anything to know what their memory is. In contrast, a “derivative state” is defined as a state that represents meaning only by relying on the subject’s interpretation or social consensus. In the previous example, the information stored in the notebook is in a derivative state as a list of electronic signals. After being viewed by the subject, the information in the notebook is still derivative. However, after viewing it, the subject has a memory. For Rowlands, the cognitive process is not the conversion of derivative states into mental states, but rather the manipulation of derivative states to create mental states. This emphasizes that cognition is an interaction between the subject and the environment.
The mental state does not extend outside the subject’s body, but rather the cognitive process that generates the mental state extends. This extended cognitive process can only exist if it belongs to the cognizing subject, that is, if it is integrated with the subject who detects changes in the environment and adjusts his or her behavior accordingly. For Rowlands, there is no such thing as subjectless cognition. Extended cognition theory means that the problem of consciousness is not limited to the body, but extends outward. This provides important insights into understanding how our perceptions and consciousness are shaped by our interactions with the external world. From this perspective, consciousness and cognition are not simply phenomena that occur inside the brain, but are the result of complex interactions between us and our environment.
