This article discusses scientific truth, realism, and antirealism as they are discussed in the philosophy of science, focusing on the theories of Thomas Kuhn and Dr. Ha-Seok Jang, and summarizes the author’s thoughts on whether science can pursue truth or is merely a tool that provides useful knowledge.
The philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy that explores what science is and where it is headed. Traditionally, many philosophers of science have shed light on issues such as the distinction between science and pseudoscience and the question of “can we trust the results of observations?”, and the field of philosophy of science has continued to expand. In particular, philosophy of science has emphasized that science is more than just the accumulation of knowledge by exploring the nature of science. This has led to deep reflection on the goals and methodologies of science, which has extended to discussions of how scientific inquiry affects society and human life.
In this essay, I will summarize what philosophers of science think about whether humans can reach scientific truth, as well as my own thoughts on the matter. The question of whether it is possible to arrive at scientific truth, or whether it actually matters, is one of the most important debates in the philosophy of science, as it goes hand-in-hand with the question of whether science is merely describing phenomena or digging for deeper truths.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn, a philosopher of science, used the term “paradigm” to describe the changes in scientific theories that people accept. When a single great study establishes a trend in scientific research, it becomes a paradigm, and the activity of studying detailed problems based on their paradigm is called “normal science. According to Kuhn’s theory, normal science is the process of solving problems within an existing paradigm, and in this process, researchers tend to strengthen and extend existing theories rather than accept new ones. However, as research continues, more and more anomalies arise that cannot be explained by the existing paradigm, leading to a “scientific revolution” in which a new paradigm replaces the old one.
Kuhn viewed scientific progress as merely “replacing a paradigm with a better one,” and argued in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that science undergoes revolutionary changes that improve our ability to solve problems but do not move us toward truth. Kuhn’s argument shocked the philosophy of science community at the time and sparked a debate about whether science is really a search for absolute truth. Kuhn’s argument sparked a rethinking of the nature of science, especially as it overturned the traditional view that science simply arrives at truth through cumulative progress.
Kuhn’s argument has been followed by a debate among philosophers of science that asks, “Is science inaccessible to truth?” in which realism and antirealism emerge and compete. Realism argues that the ultimate goal of science is to obtain the truth about nature, while antirealism argues that the goal of science is not to obtain the truth but to find useful knowledge, and that it is impossible to access the truth.
According to realism, scientific theories are designed to resemble reality, and they evolve to be as close to reality as possible. From this perspective, science is a process of getting closer and closer to the truth. However, I oppose realism because it seeks scientific truths that don’t even exist. Since we don’t know what reality is, it seems that we can’t know if science is progressing in the right direction. This position of realism is similar to that of a religious person who believes in and reveres a being called “God” that no one can know if it exists or not. Realism also has a major problem when dealing with unobservable objects such as electromagnetic fields, black holes, and dark matter. When scientific theories deal with unobservable subjects, the question of whether a scientist should believe in the theory or only in what can be observed is a crucial one because there is no way to verify that the theory is correct. Realists argue that you can have a good theory about unobservable things and test it, while anti-realists argue that you can only believe in things that can be verified through direct experience.
In my opinion, unobservability literally means that we can only have access to the object as a theory, so ‘verification’ itself seems to be impossible, so I’m in favor of the anti-realists. Van Friesen, a leading scientific antirealist, argued that all theories are hypotheses after all, and that theories, especially those dealing with unobservable subjects, cannot be proved or disproved by empirical evidence and will therefore remain hypotheses forever. This argument forces us to rethink the nature of science. The question of whether science seeks truth or merely provides practical knowledge is deeply connected to the purpose of science. He also argued that trying to push the limits of science is ephemeral, and that claiming to have overcome the limits of science with a theory is unfounded arrogance.
However, I don’t agree with everything the anti-realists say. Larry Laudan, one of the anti-realists, argued that there is no such thing as successful science because there is no guarantee that theories that are successful today will not be discarded later, which I think is too negative. The process of new theories emerging and old ones being discarded is an effort to explain the world more clearly. I believe that every time a clearer scientific theory emerges, people understand phenomena better, and that science is a success. I also believe that to deny the success of science is to deny the advances in technology that make our lives easier. New, clearer theories don’t always make the old ones obsolete, and chemistry, in particular, despite its many advances, often uses old theories without discarding them.
For example, the Lewis structure, valence shell electron pair repulsion theory (VSEPR), hybrid orbital theory (HOT), and molecular orbital theory (MOT) have been used to explain bonds and their shapes in molecules, each one gradually overcoming theoretical limitations and problems. When each theory first appeared, it was seen as a new way to overcome the limitations of existing theories, but over time, each theory has been recognized for its own merits and still retains academic value. This shows that scientific theories are not simply discarded, but evolve and complement each other. It also suggests that scientific progress does not consist solely of the emergence of new theories, but rather of the constant revision and refinement of existing theories. This is a complex process that allows us to build more accurate and sophisticated theories.
Among the many theories about truth and progress that have been proposed by scholars, the one that impressed me the most was that of Dr. Ha-Seok Jang. Unlike the opposing views of scientific truth and progress, such as realism and anti-realism, Dr. Jang advocates a different concept: active realism. Realism is an active scientific ideology that uses all theories and methods to learn as much as possible about reality, and Dr. Jang argues that in order to realize realism, we must simultaneously allow and maintain conflicting scientific theoretical systems.
Dr. Jang’s argument is particularly noteworthy in that it emphasizes the complexity and pluralism of modern science. The fact that science is not moving toward a single truth, but rather that multiple conflicting theories can coexist, demonstrates the flexibility and adaptability of science. It also emphasizes that the role of scientific theories is not to establish the truth, but to simplify and explain what is happening. This means that science is not bound by any single truth, but rather attempts to understand the world through a variety of methodologies and perspectives.
I think the merit of realism, as argued by Dr. Jang, lies in its rejection of realism’s claim that scientific theories seek scientific truth, and its recognition that science has been successfully advanced. Of course, there is a sense that the realist position is a mixture and complement of the already studied realist and anti-realist positions. However, I think it is an adequate account of the relationship between reality and theory without taking sides. Especially given the complexity and pluralism of scientific theories, I think realism is an important contribution to modern philosophy of science in that it reflects an effort to recognize and integrate different approaches to science.
No one can know if there is such a thing as scientific truth, and I oppose the realist position. But even if truth were not the goal, science would be able to explain phenomena more successfully and clearly through endless progress. I believe that science is valuable for its ability to explain and understand facts, and that we should allow for and be exposed to a variety of theories in order to understand the world. I think this is the most important stance to take as a student of science, and I believe that science will advance through the effort to embrace many theories. Progress in science is not just about discovering new theories, it is about constantly rethinking and expanding the way we look at the world.
