The throat-clearing and beer-bottle smashing in the movies we grew up watching aren’t just about showing off. It’s a way to send a strong signal to others through your own unique abilities, and it’s an example of the “costly signaling” hypothesis. This hypothesis is found in a variety of fields, including art, sports, and academia, and plays an important role in human social interactions.
Consider a scene from one of your favorite gangster movies from your childhood. There’s a typical behavior that two people do before a fight or duel. One of them moves his neck from side to side, making a cracking sound, and the other picks up a gourd next to him and smashes it against his head, splitting the gourd in two. Sometimes, he’ll even take a beer bottle next to him and smash it against his head, shattering the beer bottle. Are they just being silly, or do they have something to gain by doing so? They are using an ability that only they have to send a signal to others. In this case, this ability is something that not everyone has, and the book calls it “expensive”. Now, let’s explain the fourth hypothesis, “expensive signaling,” with a few examples.
A costly signal is a unique ability to set oneself apart from others. Peacock feathers, luxury cars, designer clothes, and the potlatch festival of the Kwakiutl tribe are examples of costly signaling as a socioeconomic phenomenon. The signal must be inimitable and only credible if it is truly expensive. And once the signal is costly enough to be trusted, the true winner is determined in a competitive system of two or more players.
First, consider the strange behavior of gazelles, which is not altruistic by design. When a lion is chasing them, some gazelles will run in place, unlike their fellow gazelles, who will walk away and run for their lives. Even though the lion is right in front of them. These strange gazelles are showing off their running ability, which is enough to keep them from being caught by a lion. Here, the hopping becomes a signal of how well the gazelle can run. And it can be an expensive signal to send, because it’s a signal that not just anyone can send.
Christine Hawkes applied this hypothesis to the lives of the Aceh tribe in Paraguay. She hypothesizes that hunting is a way for the Acehnese to implicitly show off their abilities. One of the most despised behaviors in these societies is to be “cocky,” so the only way to indirectly demonstrate one’s abilities in a society where it’s difficult to verbally show off one’s abilities is to excel in the hunt and return with a huge kill. In other words, sharing the fruits of their labor with other members of the tribe is another way to show off their abilities. What’s in it for them to show off their abilities? This phenomenon of showing off also extends to mate selection. Just like in the modern world, a man’s abilities are a big factor in a woman’s choice of a mate. In this tribe, being a good hunter means you’re capable, and therefore you get to choose a better mate. Of course, it’s a different factor for married men.
Similarly, giving to others, caring for others in difficult situations, fighting valiantly in a war between tribes, and being the first to uphold the norms of society and punish those who violate them can be expensive signals to others of one’s own qualities. This theory is especially true for people who want to publicize their good deeds to others. Most people have a desire to let others know about their altruistic behavior. There are countless examples of altruistic behavior in our society right now, and there are many examples where the costly signaling hypothesis could apply. However, there are some behaviors that cannot be explained by this hypothesis, such as an elderly woman who anonymously donates her life’s earnings to the needy. All hypotheses have this mix of applicability and inapplicability.
“Sending expensive signals” can be found in art, sports, and even academia. When an artist uses a difficult technique to create a work of art, or an athlete sets a record that pushes them beyond their limits, they are sending a costly signal. In academia, researchers demonstrate their abilities by solving a difficult problem or coming up with an innovative theory. These costly signals play an important role in boosting an individual’s reputation and status.
But is the “costly signaling hypothesis” a realistic hypothesis that reflects the trends of modern society? Sending signals may be an instinctive human behavior, and these signals play an important role in social interactions. Therefore, the costly signaling hypothesis provides an important perspective for understanding human behavior.
