Logical positivism argues that universal statements are established through the accumulation of single-entity statements through objective observation, but this has been criticized because it cannot guarantee future truth. Critical rationalism, on the other hand, argues that propositions are formed in relation to existing theories, and that hypotheses must be verified through disprovability. Scientific theories must go beyond the mere accumulation of observations to provide complex models and conceptual frameworks, which allow for predictability.
Logical positivism holds that a statement is scientifically significant if it can be determined with certainty as true or false through objective observation, unaffected by existing theories, and that universal statements are established through the accumulation of singular statements. A singular statement refers to a specific event that occurred in a specific time and space, and a universal statement is a generalization of singular statements that can be established as a scientific theory. For example, if the unitary statement ‘This litmus test paper turns red when put in acid’ is observed without exception, then the universal statement ‘All litmus test paper turns red when put in acid’ can be established as a scientific theory.
However, this idea faces the criticism that even if a scientific theory is guaranteed to be true by the accumulation of single propositions, it cannot be guaranteed to be true as a universal proposition in the future. For example, the observation that litmus test papers have always turned red when dipped in acid does not guarantee that any litmus test paper will turn red when dipped in acid in the future. To overcome this difficulty, some logical positivists have shifted to the relaxed position that the accumulation of univocal statements makes it increasingly likely that a scientific theory will be determined to be true. However, this does not solve the problem that we do not know whether a generalized statement will continue to be true in the light of previous single-entity statements.
Critical rationalism, unlike logical positivism, believed that propositions are formed in association with existing scientific theories, and argued that it is almost impossible to observe phenomena as they are, and that while it is not possible to know for sure that a hypothesis or scientific theory is true through true propositions, it is possible to show that it is false through true propositions. For example, from the singular statement, ‘A certain litmus test paper does not turn red when put in acid,’ it is clear that the universal statement, ‘All litmus test papers turn red when put in acid,’ is false. Based on this, critical rationalism proposes disprovability as a criterion for distinguishing between science and non-science, and argues that only statements that can be disproved by observation should be recognized as scientifically meaningful.
Critical rationalism holds that new scientific theories arise from the observation of facts that cannot be explained by existing scientific theories. In this case, existing scientific theories are immediately discarded and cannot be used to modify existing scientific theories. Scientists formulate new hypotheses to solve problematic situations where facts that cannot be explained by existing scientific theories are found, and come up with cases that can test the hypotheses. If no such cases are observed, the hypothesis is given the status of a provisional scientific theory. Critical rationalism argued that science can never arrive at the true truth, but that it can approach it incrementally. All scientific theories are provisional. This is because a scientific theory can consistently survive repeated attempts to disprove it, but it can be disproven at any time. The problem with critical rationalism, however, is that it does not accurately describe the realities of science, in that in the real world of science, there are frequent attempts to improve upon existing scientific theories, rather than discard them, even when such instances have been found and they should be discarded.
A scientific theory is not simply a synthesis of a number of observed facts; it is much more complex than that. For example, Newton’s laws of motion are not just an accumulation of observations, but a mathematical model that unifies and explains those observations. These models contain concepts and principles that are more complex than individual statements and cannot be explained by the mere accumulation of statements. This complexity is also why scientific theories are more than just an accumulation of empirical data. Scientific theories often have predictability, which is an important characteristic of scientific theories. Predictability involves the ability to predict future events beyond mere observation. This predictability is difficult to achieve through the accumulation of single statements, suggesting that a scientific theory is more than just an accumulation of observations.
Furthermore, scientific theories are not just a collection of facts; they provide a conceptual framework. This framework shapes the way we understand and explain the world, which cannot be achieved through the mere accumulation of single-name statements. For example, the theory of evolution is not just a collection of biological facts; it provides a comprehensive explanation for the diversity and change of life. This shows that scientific theories are more than just empirical facts. Scientific theories are based on empirical observations, but they also have a conceptual framework and predictability that goes beyond them, which is why they cannot be explained by the mere accumulation of observations.
As such, scientific theories are more than just an accumulation of single statements; they include complex and predictive models, which is an important factor in understanding how scientific theories are formed and validated.
