Abelard explores the relationship between intention and action in human judgment of good and evil, arguing that intention is central to moral judgment. However, social punishment for actions is also necessary, reflecting our imperfect judgment and social responsibility.
There is a significant gap between experiencing good and bad deeds as an outsider and feeling them as an agent. From the former perspective, it is difficult to understand the intentions of the actor. We can only judge the goodness or badness of an action based on the actor’s behavior and the surrounding circumstances. On the other hand, when you’re in the latter position, you realize that intentions and actions aren’t that simple. Behavior is not a simple expression of intent. Sometimes we act in accordance with our intentions, but many times we don’t. As an actor, you might argue that your intentions weren’t that way. However, others who observe the behavior can only infer the intentions of the actor. This raises the question. Abelard answers these questions by exploring the notion of intention: “Is it intention, and if so, how can others who are not the subject of the act know about it?” “Is it an act, and if so, does it matter if the actor actually had a different intention?” Abelard explores the notion of intention.
He distinguishes between will (voluntas) and intention (intentio, consensus). Will in this context refers to the desire to want something. In Abelard’s view, desires in and of themselves are not sinful. Primary desires, such as lust, greed, and murder, are unavoidable as human beings. However, this does not mean that primary desires are affirmed. At the same time, humans have secondary, higher-level desires that try to avoid giving in to primary desires. These two kinds of needs are the basis of our moral struggle. However, neither primary desires nor the desire to resist them are central to moral judgment. The criterion for good or evil depends on whether we agree or disagree with the desire. “When we have consented to do an unlawful act, that is the moment when we are virtually unable to escape performing it, and when we are inwardly prepared to do it if given the opportunity.”
If intention, or the moment of consent, determines sinfulness, what significance do acts have in Abelard’s theory? Abelard says that acts do not add to or subtract from human goodness or evil. Up to this point in his argument, Abelard seems to favor intentionality in response to the question raised at the beginning of this article about where the criterion for good and evil lies. His view may face some opposition. If intention alone can determine good and evil, should others be expected to tolerate and understand evil acts that stem from non-evil intentions, but are considered evil by others? Abelard’s answer is no. Abelard recognizes the punishment of behavior. It is for the good of society as a whole and to prevent public loss. But how to punish an act is a human matter. God knows all things, and the intentions of the actor are no exception. God judges man only through intentions.
Abelard’s explanation, however, is somewhat weak. Abelard wants to point to human helplessness in coercive situations as a basis for the moral irrelevance of actions. But if human beings are physically imperfect, can they not also be mentally imperfect? If they consider their intentions to be non-evil and justified, are they actually so? Abelard had to face considerable resistance in his time: the Jews and Roman soldiers who crucified Christ would never have considered their intentions to be evil. If so, their actions must also be good because of their intentions. This conclusion is difficult for Christians to accept. To resolve this difficulty, we must address the human psyche. Human judgment is imperfect. While we can grasp natural law through reason, there is a gap between it and the divine law. If we base our judgment of intent and consent on natural law, error is already inherent. If God’s true judgment of intent is based on the Divine Law, then God’s judgment will differ from human judgment. It is questionable whether it is really appropriate to say that God’s judgment is based on the divine law. It might be more appropriate to call the contextualization of God’s will a theocracy. But there is no further discussion of this. If human judgment is imperfect, Abelard is reticent about whether it can be made better or whether it is impossible.
How can the gap between Abelard’s claimed moral irrelevance of an act and the justification of punishment for an act be bridged? Punishment for an act takes place within society, so it is impossible not to consider the position of the members of society. For a seemingly evil act, the members of society expect the actor to receive the punishment they deserve. This behavior is due to human cognitive limitations. While humans realize the importance of intentions and the moral powerlessness of actions when they are the actor, they cannot help but feel that the act itself is good or evil in the eyes of a third party. Therefore, punishment is executed according to the goodness or badness of an act as perceived by the members of society.
The Christian rejection of the moral irrelevance of actions. Abelard says that punishment can be justified for an act. This can be explained by a difference in position. When a person is the subject of an act, they can subscribe to Avellard’s ethics of intention. This is because when we commit an act that is inconsistent with our intentions, we can feel remorse for it. This is because even if the intention is not carried out, the person can still feel that he or she harbored it. This was the case with the Jewish and Roman soldiers who crucified Christ. The actors, including Pilate and the Jewish religious leaders, could only directly feel their intentions, whether good or bad, and they probably knew better than anyone else that they had already prepared themselves internally before they acted. Christians, however, can never know the position of those who crucified Christ, and judge their goodness or badness based solely on the act of crucifying Christ.
In this sense, Abelard dualizes the standard of morality. The actor can never be excluded from the act. And according to Abelard’s thesis, the most important moral measure of the actor is intention, consent, or lack thereof. The moral judgment of intention is made by God. God has full knowledge of intentions and makes perfect judgments about them. There is no room for social members to intervene here. They are secondary to the moral judgment of intentions. However, as Aristotle says, humans are social or political animals. Society is indispensable to our existence as human beings. This is because society is the premise for realizing humanity. In that sense, social members are not secondary, and the moral judgments they make cannot be rejected by the actor. In addition to the moral judgment of intentions, there is also the moral judgment of actions made by members of society.
This is a difficult way of thinking to accept at the time. God was not recognized as a means of moral judgment, but rather as the source from which humans can make moral judgments. The difference between the moral judgment of God and the moral judgment of man would have been quite a shock to their sensibilities. However, Abelard’s way of thinking is not entirely alien to them, as one of the common Christian maxims is: “Who do you hate? It is not the person you really hate. It’s only the person’s actions that you hate,” is the basis for this mindset. Abelard’s dualistic structure of moral judgment is still accepted in modern times, along with aphorisms like this one.
